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REMARKs BVW. MICHAEL REISMAN"
Radical changes in the technology of weapons and the nature of adversaries now
challenge the jus ad bellum that was largely codified in the United Nations Charter:
Unilateral and discretionary uses of proactive military force, until then lawful, were
henceforth prohibited; reactive military force was to be limited to self-defense against
an armed attack, and then only until the international community could come to the
assistance of a victim of unlawful military force. All uses of force were to be necessary,
proportionate, and discriminating. The major powers in the Security Council under-
took to cooperate to ensure the collective defense of victims of aggression.
Even those who assumed that the Security Council would wield the power the Charter
assigned it appropriately did not imagine that the Council would act quickly, but time
was of the essence less then than now, given the character and potential of the arsenals
of adversaries. Before air warfare was expanded and refined, weapons were essentially
kinetic and usually limited in reach to the peripheries of targeted territories. A surprise
attack could be costly to its victim, but not decisive. Most important, critical weapons
were likely to be available in militarily significant quanta only to other states, whose
elites, however different their cultures and values, generally shared an interest in main-
taining the state system of which all were part. Each elite's own territorial base made it
at once member and beneficiary of and hostage to the system, susceptible to the dy-
namic ofreciprocity and retaliation that is the source of the effectiveness ofinternational
law. All of these factors shaped a common interest in a legal regime that restricted the
rationale for self-defense to an actual armed attack.
The introduction of vastly more destructive and rapidly delivered weapons began to
undercut the cogency of that legal regime. The reason was simple: a meaningful self-
defense could be irretrievably lost if an adversary with much more destructive weapons
and poised to attack had to initiate (in effect, accomplish) its attack before a right of
self-defense came into operation. This development prompted a claim to expand the
right of reactive self-defense (RSD) to "anticipatory" self-defense (ASD).
ASD addressed the security of the intended victim in a weapons environment in which
he who struck first could deliver an unacceptable measure ofdamage, ifnot win outright.
But in order to move from RSD to ASD, the objectively verifiable requirement of an
armed attack had to yield to a subjective perception of a "threat" of such an attack that
was-in the sole judgment of the state that thought it was about to become a target-so
palpable, imminent, and prospectively destructive that the only defense was its preven-
tion. ASD is open to abuse by self-serving interpretations in ways that RSD was not. Hence
ASD's legal authority remained cloudy and much offormallegal doctrine rejected its law-
fulness. Nevertheless, security planners could not afford to exclude the possibility of it.
The dynamic of reciprocity and retaliation that underlies international law does not
operate for non-state actors, for they are neither beneficiaries of nor hostages to the
territorial system. As long as non-state actors did not have significant arsenals, their
indifference or even hostility to world public order was inconsequential, but the prolif-
eration ofatomic, biological, and chemical ("ABC") weapons and their diffusion into the
hands of nonstate actors who may operate from within failed or feckless states has
changed that. Even an ABM system that worked could not screen biological and chem-
ical weapons. Nor can the most effective perimeter defense prevent the infiltration and
detonation ofa "dirty b~mb."And deterrence-the "stick" halfof the reciprocity-retali-
ation dyad-eannot operate when there is no address to deter. These developments
have given impetus to a new claim of "preemptive" self-defense (PSD) .
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PSD is a claim of authority to use, unilaterally and without international authoriza-
tion, high levels ofviolence in order to arrest a development that is not yet operational
and hence is not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to mature, could be
neutralized only at a high, possibly unacceptable, cost. A credible claim for ASD must
point to a palpable and imminent threat; a claim for PSD need only point to a possibil-
ity, a contingency. The further one moves from an actual armed attack as the requisite
threshold of RSD to the palpable and imminent threat of attack that is the threshold
of ASD, and from there to the conjectural and contingent threats of possible attack,
which is the threshold ofPSD, the greater the interpretive latitude given the would-be
unilateralist and the heavier the burden of proof. In an international system marked
by radically different values and perceptions offacts, an act ofPSD may look like a seri-
ous or hysterical misjudgment to some actors and like naked aggression to others.
The U.S. claim to PSD is not new. It was made implicitly throughout the 1990s by the
Clinton administration with respect to aerial military action to "degrade" Iraqi military
capacities. In December 2002, former President Clinton stated that plans to attack North
Korea had been prepared and Pyongyang was told it would be struck if it did not end
its nuclear program. If threats or overt but relatively limited acts aimed at degradation
of an adversary's arsenal fail, may further and even more intrusive preemptive acts
against the adversary be taken in "self-defense"?
International law has grappled with the claim ofPSD for decades. The Israeli destruc-
tion of the Osirak reactor near Baghdad in 1981, a quintessential preemptive action, was
widely condemned at the time. Scarcely a decade later, with the lethal and aggressive
character of the regime in Baghdad exposed, opinions about the preemptive action of
1981 were revised in many quarters, suggesting that there were unarticulated but
operative criteria for assessing the lawfulness of preemptive actions.
All acts ofself-defense are by their nature initiated unilaterally and evaluated for their
lawfulness only after the fact. In all claims to self-defense, review of the action will be
based on a prudential contextual assessment offactors such as the degree of the threat,
the availability of a meaningful organized international response, the urgency of uni-
lateral action to prevent or deflect the attack, and whether the means chosen were pro-
portionate to the threat presented. Thus, on a case-by-ease basis, the legal danger ofan
abuse of preemptive self-defense is no greater than for anticipatory self-defense, which
also does not have to be justified by an armed attack. Humanitarian intervention does
not even require demonstration ofa real or conjectural threat against an intervening state.
The problem is thus not the absence oflegal criteria. The danger presented by the PSD
doctrine is systemic: If writ large and generally available in international law, it could,
even more than ASD, lead to more international violence by lowering the threshold for
unilaterally determined contingencies that warrant acts ofself-defense. This could create
an imperative for all latent adversaries to strike sooner in order to strike first, raising the
general expectation of violence-and its likelihood. It is not hard to imagine circum-
stances in which PSD might appearjustified. Yet if universalized, the claim, by increas-
ing the expectation and likelihood of violence, could undermine minimum order.
The dilemma does not derive from the power of a single state but is inherent in a
legal system whose central institutions continue to be weak and that accordingly re-
serves to each state, in Article 51 of the Charter, a right to engage in unilateral action
when it is necessary for its self-defense, while assigning to a small group of powerful
states the residual responsibility for global security. Because there does not appear to
be a will to strengthen central institutions, in new and more threatening environments,
international law may have to appraise individual PSD claims in terms of the customary
law principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.
